The Limits of Cooperation and Coercion in Denuclearizing North Korea: The Case for Containment > Journal

This article examines two questions: how feasible the denuclearization of North Korea is and what strategies could realistically achieve it. It finds that denuclearization through international cooperation is highly unlikely because Pyongyang remains firmly determined to maintain its nuclear arsenal. Diplomatic efforts centered on cooperation between the United States and North Korea falter due to deep mutual distrust, while China and Russia shift the diplomatic burden onto Washington. Denuclearization through coercion is also improbable: military action risks triggering a large-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, and economic sanctions have limited effect as North Korea has adapted to prolonged pressure. Moreover, China and Russia constrain international sanctions because they fear instability or regime collapse in North Korea. Given these constraints, the article proposes containment as a more feasible strategy. This approach combines nuclear and conventional deterrence with stringent techno-economic sanctions designed to limit the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Effective implementation would require close coordination between Washington and Seoul and broader international cooperation. If cooperative denuclearization is pursued in the future, the most plausible pathway would involve China and Russia assuming a leading diplomatic role.

The Limits of Cooperative Denuclearization

The Limits of Coercive Denuclearization

The Most Realistic Alternative: Containment

The Second-Best Alternative: Nuclear Alliance Restraint

Conclusion and Implication